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 Critical Response
 IV
 Truth or Consequences:
 On Being Against Theory
 Steven Mailloux
 Before reading "Against Theory" by Steven Knapp and Walter Benn
 Michaels, I thought I fully understood Stanley Fish's theory of inter-
 pretive communities. Fish's theory seemed a consistent elaboration of
 the claim that there are no uninterpreted givens. What we take to be
 independent facts are actually constructions of our interpretive assump-
 tions and strategies. From this perspective, texts do not determine inter-
 pretations; interpretations constitute texts. Furthermore, interpretive
 practices are never idiosyncratic; that is, acts of making sense are always
 a function of shared beliefs or interpretive conventions. Every individual
 interpreter is a member of an interpretive community: "Since the
 thoughts an individual can think and the mental operations he can per-
 form have their source in some or other interpretive community, he is as
 much a product of that community (acting as an extension of it) as the
 meanings it enables him to produce."' Such a grounding of interpreta-
 tion in communities defends this hermeneutic theory against the charge
 of relativism, the bugbear of the Anglo-American critical tradition since
 the heyday of New Criticism. New Critics claimed to avoid interpretive
 relativism by grounding meaning objectively in the autonomous text.
 Later, E. D. Hirsch tried to show that New Critical theory and practice
 resulted in the very relativism the New Critics abhorred; Hirsch argued
 that priority must be given to authorial intention in order to determine
 valid or correct interpretations. Fish's theory of interpretive com-
 munities holds that interpretation produces both textual meaning and
 1. Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities
 (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), p. 14.
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 authorial intention, but he avoids relativism by showing that there are
 always correct interpretations, determined by communities rather than
 individuals. Individual interpreters are not free to see or describe any
 textual meaning they want-the fear of the New Critics-nor is meaning
 made radically indeterminate-the complaint of Hirsch against the
 anti-intentionalists. Rather, correct interpretations always exist and can
 be (are already) determined. It's just that because interpretive com-
 munities can change, so too can what counts as a correct interpretation.
 So went my understanding of Fish's position before reading
 "Against Theory." However, I now see that this previous understanding
 was incomplete. To approach "Against Theory" and eventually reveal its
 incompleteness, we can begin with a literary example of the two her-
 meneutic accounts that Knapp and Michaels reject on their way to re-
 jecting theory in general.
 In George Orwell's 1984 the Party maintains its absolute power over
 the people of Oceania by completely controlling all individual acts of
 interpretation. Through material and ideological coercion, the Party
 imposes its way of making sense on its people and achieves "the persis-
 tence of a certain world-view and a certain way of life" which forms the
 basis of its totalitarian rule.2 This hermeneutic imperialism guarantees
 that the people will continue to be "without any impulse to rebel" because
 they are "without the power of grasping that the world could be other
 than it is" (p. 173). O'Brien, the spokesman for the Party, points out the
 philosophical assumption underlying its successful politics of interpreta-
 tion: "Reality is inside the skull. . . . Nothing exists except through
 human consciousness" (p. 218). Since the Party controls interpretation, it
 controls human consciousness and thus manipulates reality itself. One
 would-be rebel, Winston Smith, tries to resist the Party by attacking its
 hermeneutics. He champions common sense, autonomous facts, exter-
 nal reality, and the empirical method. Though elsewhere Orwell sup-
 ports Smith's philosophical stance, in 1984 he allows O'Brien to win the
 argument (both rhetorically and politically) during the final confronta-
 tion between Smith and the Party spokesman.3 O'Brien argues that "re-
 2. George Orwell, 1984 (1949; New York, 1961), p. 173; all further references to this
 work will be included in the text.
 3. See Gerald Graff, "Politics, Language, Deconstruction, Lies, and the Reflexive
 Fallacy: A Rejoinder to W. J. T. Mitchell," Salmagundi 47-48 (Winter-Spring 1980): 88-89.
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 ality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. Not in the individual
 mind,... only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal.
 Whatever the Party holds to be truth is truth. It is impossible to see
 reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party" (p. 205). Smith is
 not able to counter O'Brien's arguments, and ultimately the Party is
 successful in achieving its goal: "We shall squeeze you empty, and then
 we shall fill you with ourselves" (p. 211). Smith submits by internalizing
 the Party's world view and adopting its hermeneutic theory.
 It is inevitable that Smith must lose, not only because he confronts
 the overwhelming power of the state but also because he presents such a
 weak case for his hermeneutic position. As O'Brien points out, Smith
 holds that "the nature of reality is self-evident" (p. 205). He fails to
 understand that his commonsense "facts" are as much a product of
 interpretation as are the Party's; and he clings to a naive realist ontology
 and a simplistic commonsense epistemology that O'Brien demolishes
 from his dominant political position, through a more sophisticated her-
 meneutic argument, a form of idealism he calls "collective solipsism" (p.
 219).
 Knapp and Michaels would find neither Smith's realism nor
 O'Brien's idealism to be satisfactory as hermeneutic theories. They write
 that "a realist thinks that theory allows us to stand outside our beliefs in a
 neutral encounter with the objects of interpretation; an idealist thinks
 that theory allows us to stand outside our beliefs in a neutral encounter
 with our beliefs themselves" ("Against Theory," p. 739). A realist like
 Smith is mistaken when he assumes that "the object exists independent
 of beliefs" and that "knowledge requires that we shed our beliefs in a
 disinterested quest for the object" (p. 740). An idealist like O'Brien
 avoids this mistake when he implies that "we can never shed our beliefs,"
 but he commits his own kind of error when he equates knowledge with
 "recognizing the role beliefs play in constituting their objects" (p. 740).
 This constitutive hermeneutics is a necessary corollary of both O'Brien's
 collective solipsism and Fish's theory of interpretive communities.4 In
 the same way that O'Brien claims that the Party's collective mind creates
 reality, Fish argues that interpretive communities create what they claim
 merely to be discovering or describing. Of course, O'Brien and Fish
 perceive themselves as living within radically different arrangements of
 hermeneutic power. O'Brien sees himself as the extension of an inter-
 pretive community (the Party) that completely dominates the world of
 1984. Fish, on the other hand, claims that his world contains many
 competing communities, each vying for interpretive hegemony for its set
 of beliefs, values, and ideologies.
 4. For discussions of constitutive hermeneutics, see my Interpretive Conventions: The
 Reader in the Study of American Fiction (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), pp. 192-207, and "Learning to
 Read: Interpretation and Reader-Response Criticism," Studies in the Literary Imagination 12
 (Spring 1979): 93-108.
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 Despite such differences in their sociological accounts, O'Brien and
 Fish end up in the same theoretical contradiction. During his debate with
 Smith, O'Brien's epistemological idealism leads him to imply that a true
 believer within the Party could somehow get outside the Party's belief
 system into a neutral space from which to judge the Party's beliefs.
 Knapp and Michaels argue that Fish makes a similar move when he
 claims to have a theory of interpretation through which he distances
 himself from his own interpretive assumptions. This theory allows him
 to argue that previous literary critics' "assumptions were not inferior but
 merely different" from his own.5 As Knapp and Michaels point out, Fish
 is claiming here that "no beliefs are, in the long run, truer than others."
 But "it is only from the standpoint of a theory about belief which is not
 itself a belief that this truth can be seen" (p. 741). Since Fish himself
 admits there is no such standpoint outside belief, he has clearly con-
 tradicted himself. Theories like Fish's and O'Brien's which admit the
 absolute primacy of belief in practice cannot turn around and claim to
 escape belief in theory.
 Knapp and Michaels ultimately argue that all theories cannot avoid
 similar contradictions or incoherencies whenever theory attempts to pre-
 scribe critical practice. They demonstrate how typical theorists base their
 methodological prescriptions on the prior separation of entities that are
 in fact logically inseparable (intention and meaning, language and
 speech acts, knowledge and true belief). Theorists make these false sep-
 arations so that they can prescribe moving from one entity to the other to
 arrive at meaning or truth. Thus, if theory is understood as an attempt
 to describe so that it can have prescriptive consequences, then it is in-
 coherent and should be abandoned. Theory, properly understood, has
 no consequences.
 Knapp and Michaels' arguments are convincing as far as they go.
 Their attack on theory as theory (i.e., as it conceives itself) certainly
 showed me a contradiction in Fish's theory that I had previously failed to
 notice. However, the conclusion that Knapp and Michaels draw from
 their arguments-that theory is inconsequential and should therefore
 stop-does not necessarily follow. True, theory does not have con-
 sequences in the exact way it claims to have consequences. Nevertheless,
 theory has results of a very precise kind, as I will now try to show.
 The work of Edward Said demonstrates quite clearly that theory can
 have disruptive consequences both inside and outside the discipline of
 literary studies. In Orientalism and other writings Said assumes a con-
 stitutive hermeneutics as he examines Orientalism as "the enormously
 systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage-
 and even produce-the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily,
 ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-
 5. Fish, Is There a Text?, p. 368.
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 Enlightenment period."6 Through Orientalism Europe imposed a self-
 serving meaning in an apparently disinterested way. In effect, it created
 an Orient that was ripe for domination. The imperialist West did exactly
 what the Party in 1984 tries to do: determine reality by controlling inter-
 pretation. The Party is simply more self-conscious about its "hermeneu-
 tics of power."7
 Said's project has been to reveal the ideological interests behind the
 hermeneutic power of Western discourse about the Islamic Orient. But
 Said further claims that all descriptions of the Orient (not just those by
 European and American Orientalists) are perspectival constructions
 rather than objective representations:
 I do not mean to suggest that a "real" Islam exists somewhere out
 there that the media, acting out of base motives, have perverted.
 Not at all. For Muslims as for non-Muslims, Islam is an objective
 and also a subjective faith, because people create that fact in their
 faith, in their societies, histories, and traditions, or, in the case of
 non-Muslim outsiders, because they must in a sense fix, personify,
 stamp the identity of that which they feel confronts them collec-
 tively or individually. This is to say that the media's Islam, the
 Western scholar's Islam, the Western reporter's Islam, and the
 Muslim's Islam are all acts of will and interpretation that take place
 in history, and can only be dealt with in history as acts of will and
 interpretation.8
 Since Said also grounds these acts of hermeneutic will in "communities
 of interpretation," his theory resembles the epistemological idealism of
 O'Brien and Fish, who claim that shared beliefs (assumptions, values,
 ideologies) constitute reality.9 Though these theories are at times vul-
 nerable to the "beliefless neutrality" objection discussed above, much
 more often they support assertions like Knapp and Michaels' that there
 is no "condition of knowledge prior to and independent of belief" (p.
 738). If Knapp and Michaels are correct that "no general account of
 belief [similar to their own] can have practical consequences," then these
 idealist epistemologies that posit the primacy of belief should also be
 inconsequential (p. 740). But such accounts can and do have con-
 sequences. In the world of 1984, the theory of collective solipsism pro-
 vides a philosophical base for totalitarian domination. In the realm of
 American scholarship and politics, Said's theoretical assumptions guide
 his practical analyses of Orientalism, and these analyses have had very
 definite consequences as the debates within the New Republic, the New
 6. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York, 1978), p. 3; emphasis added.
 7. The term is Graff's in "Textual Leftism," Partisan Review 49 (1982):566.
 8. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the
 World (New York, 1981), p. 41. See also Orientalism, pp. 273 and 322.
 9. Said, Covering Islam, p. 41.
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 York Review of Books, History and Theory, and other journals testify. In-
 deed, a recent Humanities Report article noted that "the position Said
 represents [in Orientalism] has produced a set of semi-academic study
 groups and has implications for government and foreign policy."'0
 But how exactly can a hermeneutic theory that, according to Knapp
 and Michaels, should have no consequences result in these rhetorical
 and political effects? In Said's case, the reason is that when he reveals
 Orientalist representations as based on interested belief rather than im-
 personal truth, objectivists read his demystifying project as (successfully
 or unsuccessfully) undermining the validity of Orientalist inter-
 pretations, and Orientalism's victims read this same project as providing
 support for the objectivity of their own self-interpretations. These ap-
 propriations of Said's discourse can occur because a demonstration that
 others' asserted truth is actually interested belief always counts as a cri-
 tique of their assertions in the present arena of critical and political
 discussion. In such an arena, to expose asserted truth as "mere" belief is
 to have the effect of undermining that truth even though the debunker
 elsewhere insists that all truth is perspectival belief. Even in an essay in
 which Said foregrounds the perspective from which he makes his
 analysis (e.g., in "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims"), his dis-
 course still has the rhetorical effect of proof or propaganda (depending
 on whether the reader is convinced or not by his arguments)."
 But political consequences are only the most far-reaching results of
 theory. More limited but just as real are the effects of theoretical pre-
 scriptions within the discipline of literary studies. Even if it is granted
 that all theories are based on logical mistakes (like separating intention
 and meaning), theories still have consequences for critical practice. All
 we need do is remember the effects of New Critical proscriptions against
 the intentional and affective fallacies. The critics persuaded by these
 theoretical prohibitions avoided extrinsic approaches and directed their
 analyses to intrinsic elements in the literary text itself-image patterns,
 symbolic structures, and so forth. More recently, theories of un-
 decidability have changed the interpretive practices of many within the
 discipline: instead of looking for unities, they look for disunities, con-
 tradictions, incoherencies. Theory does change practice.
 Here we finally reach the limits of Knapp and Michaels' account of
 theory. Their description turns out to be as incomplete as my previous
 understanding of Fish's work was incomplete. Theory does claim to be
 what Knapp and Michaels define it as, but theory actually functions
 differently. In fact, theory is a kind of practice, a peculiar kind because it
 claims to escape practice. But the impossibility of achieving this goal does
 10. Colin R. MacKinnon, "Talking Back: Orientalism and the Orientals," Humanities
 Report 4 (Feb. 1982): 5.
 11. See Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," Social Text 1 (Winter
 1979): 7-58; rev. and rpt. in Said, The Question of Palestine (New York, 1979), pp. 56-114.
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 766 For and Against Theory
 not prevent theory from continuing, nor does it negate the effects it has
 as persuasion. It is telling that Knapp and Michaels do not call for the end
 of critical practice even though they reject criticism's claim to find
 meaning objectively in autonomous texts, intentions, or reading experi-
 ences. Michaels has pointed out correctly that such practice misconceives
 its function: the meanings it claims to find are actually determined com-
 pletely by the beliefs it assumes.12 Similarly, theory claims to be in a
 neutral position beyond belief and turns out not to be, yet as theoretical
 practice it can still affect other practices as persuasion. Theory can sim-
 ply continue doing what all discursive practices do: attempt to persuade
 its readers to adopt its point of view, its way of seeing texts and the
 world. Whether successful persuasion takes place as a result of misun-
 derstanding or not, theory can be consequential as rhetorical induce-
 ment and thus will never be abandoned (as Knapp and Michaels no
 doubt realize).
 In their conclusion to "Against Theory," the authors write:
 The theoretical impulse, as we have described it, always in-
 volves the attempt to separate things that should not be separated:
 on the ontological side, meaning from intention, language from
 speech acts; on the epistemological side, knowledge from true be-
 lief. Our point has been that the separated terms are in fact in-
 separable. It is tempting to end by saying that theory and practice
 too are inseparable. But this would be a mistake. Not because
 theory and practice (unlike the other terms) really are separate but
 because theory is nothing else but the attempt to escape practice.
 Meaning is just another name for expressed intention, knowledge
 just another name for true belief, but theory is not just another
 name for practice. [Pp. 741-42]
 Though they deny it here, Knapp and Michaels do seem to separate
 theory and practice. They could have said that "theory is just another
 name for metapractice (practice about practice)." Instead they chose to
 imply a distinction between two kinds of discourse that are similar in
 function: theory is an instantiation of practice even as it claims to escape
 from practice. Why do Knapp and Michaels ignore this? Strangely, this
 implied separation of theory and practice can be seen as strengthening
 rather than weakening their argument. Indeed it confirms at least part
 of it. Like all theoretical discourse, "Against Theory" separates the
 inseparable-theory from practice-in order to prescribe practice-the
 abandonment of theory. Of course, whether Knapp and Michaels'
 theory has consequences depends on whether it persuades readers to
 take its amusing examples and ingenious arguments seriously. I hope I
 have done so.
 12. See Walter Benn Michaels, "Saving the Text: Reference and Belief," MLN 93
 (Dec. 1978): 771-93.
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